ATSB Sidesteps Debris-Planting Issue

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Earlier today, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau issued a report entitled, “Debris examination — update No. 1: Identification of two items of debris recovered in Mozambique.” The report confirms that the pieces are consistent with a right-hand flap fairing and a right horizontal stabilizer, pointing out that the lettering found on each part matches stencils used by Malaysia airlines. In the case of the piece found by Blaine Alan Gibson, shown above, the report says:

The fastener head markings identified it as being correct for use on the stabiliser panel assembly. The markings also identified the fastener manufacturer. That manufacturer’s fasteners were not used in current production, but did match the fasteners used in assembly of the aircraft next in the production line (405) to 9M-MRO (404).

This wording is ambiguous–does “current production” mean production at the time that 9M-MRO was built, or now? If the fastener wasn’t used when 9M-MRO was built, one wonders what it is doing in this piece. Hopefully the ATSB will clarify what it means. At any rate, the report concludes that both pieces “almost certainly from the Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 aircraft, registered 9M-MRO.”

Naturally, I was particularly keen to hear what the ATSB would say about the marine life found on these pieces, or lack thereof. The report contains a section entitled “Quarantine and marine ecology” which reads, in its entirety:

On arrival into Australia, both parts were quarantined at the Geoscience Australia facility in Canberra. The parts were unwrapped and examined for the presence of marine ecology and remnants of biological material. Visible marine ecology was present on both parts and these items were removed and preserved. The parts were subsequently cleaned and released from quarantine.

Later, in the “Conclusions” section, the report states: “At the time of writing, ongoing work was being conducted with respect to the marine ecology identification as well as testing of material samples. The results from these tests will be provided to the Malaysian investigation team once complete.”

The key here seems to be to reinforce the idea that the results of the biofouling examination will go to Malaysia, and not released to the public. Which raises the question: why does Australia feel empowered to release a fairly detailed report explaining why they think the pieces came from 9M-MRO, but not to say anything about the marine life on them? Is there a legal distinction between these two kinds of assessment, as pertains to ICAO protocols? Perhaps some legally-minded readers can shed light on the matter.

384 thoughts on “ATSB Sidesteps Debris-Planting Issue”

  1. @Warren: There were two BFO values from the log-on at 00:19. My figure addressed the first. The second, if valid, would indicate a steep descent of around 15,000 fpm for the value of -2 Hz. However, Inmarsat advises that the first BFO in the log-on sequence is reliable, but subsequent ones may not be. Some have proposed SATCOM idiosyncrasies to explain this value outside of a steep dive. I have my own theory. Until we know more, I have chosen to ignore the second value.

  2. @Sajid UK. You may well be on the right track with your post about shoot-down scenarios. Ugly as it is, there is a possibility that something of this sort has happened and one or more nations has taken appropriate action in the face of an extreme threat from terrorists.

    Hopefully this article from the ABC (Australia) about nuclear weapons is not related but interesting and scary anyway.
    http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-20/growing-concerns-is-could-steal-nuclear-weapons/7342722

    I have said this all before, but briefly: If the plane disappeared due to accident, equip malfunction, suicidal pilot, accidental shoot-down etc. then the public and of course the NOK have a right to know IMO. However, there may be some dire circumstances where it is best in our current geopolitical climate that the truth remain hidden. So, without the benefit of hindsight, should we go on searching for the truth of the matter indefinitely?

    Expecting howls of disagreement and more pilot-did-it arguments 🙂

  3. Re IFE,

    At 1827 the IFE set up a SMS/text application; was it used? On the face of it appears no.

    At 1828 the IFE set up a BITE application; this relays faults detected in the IFE. Was it used? There have been no reported defects in the system so you would probably say no.

    The IFE map receives it’s info from the FMC.

    That folks is the extent of IFE communications.

    Post 0019 the SMS/text and BITE applications did not setup; either the IFE was switched off or the IFE and/or SDU were not receiving power.

    OZ

  4. Trip posted April 21, 2016 at 9:17 PM: “Could an unreported re-set event have happened at 1725 to cause the 1825 handshake? If the pilot turned off the satellite deliberately, why would he turn it back on? ”

    At 18:03 there was no response from the aircraft to an attempt from the groundstation to send an ACARS message. For the groundstation this meant that aircraft terminal was off-line so no handshakes would be initiated after that. The only known way to de-power SATCOM from the cockpit is to isolate the Left Main AC bus which powers the SATCOM and many other services. The log-on request initiated from the aircraft (not a handshake, which is initiated by the ground station) could have been the result of re-powering the Left Main AC bus for reasons other than SATCOM.

  5. @Trip
    @All

    There is possibly another explanation for the 18:25 logon.

    I take it that the sign off at 17:19 would have been transmitted via SATCOM, so the SDU must have been de-energized after 17:19, probably very shortly after. The IFE map would still be working, being driven from the FMC. The ACARS had been deactivated at some point after 17:07. It was never switched back on.

    So now an alternative scenario. I admit what follows is speculative.

    The Captain locks the FO out of the cockpit and diverts the aircraft. The aircraft is never depressurized.
    The Captain tells the passengers there has been a serious electrical failure and that he is going to make an emergency landing at Penang. He tells them that the failure is preventing him from reopening the cockpit door.
    He fails to land at Penang and tells the passengers he going to try for Banda Aceh.
    At 18:25, he re-energizes the SATCOM, allowing the IFE logon request to go out at 18:28, but he then switches off the IFE/seat power from the overhead switch, to kill the map display and also prevent passengers sending out messages.
    The passengers become totally disorientated. It’s dark, they don’t notice the turn south toward the SIO. The Captain tells them he is still fighting to regain control. But it’s a deception. The aircraft eventually fly’s into daylight, in the middle of nowhere and makes an emergency ditching.

  6. @Phil. Work done on system that plays a crucial role the day before , It looks like you’ve got something tehre worth pursuing.
    It would also be very interesting to know what this downgrade was actually shutting off that was there before.
    Was this the planes first flight after that?

    @ trip. I’ve read this piece about loosing an engineer at inmarsat too. Makes one wonder .

  7. @ROB: “I take it that the sign off at 17:19 would have been transmitted via SATCOM”
    Please don’t invent events that did not occur.

  8. @Victorl

    I tried to compute the BFO baseline, from the discussion of the Inmarsat journal article, ie the four terms NOT involving the actual aircraft velocity & onboard partial compensation. If my calculations are accurate, then at 00:19 the aircraft was almost 50Hz below the BFO baseline of ~225 Hz. If that’s right, then we would want to find -50Hz on your computed arc.

    http://s31.postimg.org/4s4fck43f/BFO_baseline.png

  9. Um.. There’s one more thing…

    If we exclude a positive RoC > 0 at that event, then flying flat and level would leave the aircraft at -50Hz relative to baseline…

    And any expected descent would push the plane southward and westward from that most northeasterly location

  10. @Ed, thanks for this. What a strange story: a report of debris by a lone individual that a team of divers goes to investigate and can’t find. That seems very suspicious to me; as described the piece sounds large enough to be spotted without much difficulty. It also seems unlikely that a piece of debris could have floated across the ocean and then sunk before reaching shore, though I imagine some will argue it could have been banged up enough by wave action on the reef to lose its last bit of buoyancy.

    @Owen Wiseman, very interesting find. It makes me wonder if paint coming off of fastener heads is a persistent problem in the aircraft industry.

  11. Gysbreght,

    Re “9M-MRO was delivered to MAS in May 2002. ”

    I was not asking when 9M-MRO was delivered to MAS. I was asking what AIMS version was in March 2014. Could you please provide reference?

    Re: “on page 79 of your reference I read: This reset does not occur at power-up.”

    Is this statement relevant to ACARS?

    “Can you point me to the page that describes the reset you are referring to?”

    Pls. see P.74. I agree that the formulation allows for multiple interpretations, particularly because AIMS 2003 does not have “auto” mode.

  12. It doesn’t seem to specify the size of the piece. This is quite important, I think. Any large sunken section would point to a nearby impact, yes?

  13. @Gysbreght

    Re the 17:19 ATC exchange:

    So this was transmitted via HF rather than SATCOM? I looked through FI but didn’t see it specifically mentioned.

    I would have thought the a/c was too far away by this time, for VHF.

  14. @Oleksandr: The “AIMS 2003” is not ambiguous. AIMS 2003 auto mode is all boxes selected. In the absence of evidence that 9M-MRO AIMS was modified post-delivery from “not AIMS 2003” to “AIMS 2003” you should not assume that it was.

    @ROB: All communications with ATC were via VHF. If it had been via SATCOM it would be shown in the INMARSAT log.

  15. Re: envelope protections after flameout. I put this question to some 777 experts at a.net, and the consensus was that post-flameout the Primary Flight Controls will revert to secondary mode, losing envelope protection, and that even after the APU comes on line, envelope protection will not be automatically restored. It requires the pilot to cycle the PFC switch (turn it off, and then back on). The computer will then settle into the most advanced mode available, that with the APU running, would be the normal flight control mode. But of course that is a controlled input that requires a pilot to do.

    Thus, ALSM’s simulation where the aircraft was at a 35 degree bank angle for a while and then suddenly became much steeper can’t be accounted for by envelope protection provided by APU power. Either the simulation was giving erroneous outputs, or something else would be going on to account for the 35 degree bank angle.

  16. @Warren Platts: Agreed – your first paragraph is all in the DUAL ENG FAIL/STALL Non-Normal Checklist procedure.

  17. @Erik Nelson: I am not sure whether you are agreeing or disagreeing with my image which relates position along the arc at 00:19 with vertical speed.

  18. Re AIMS

    The FI doesn’t indicate there was ACARS HF mode:

    “ACARS is a digital data-link system that manages flight plan and maintenance data between the aircraft and the Ground Service Provider (GSP) by using radio i.e. VHF or satellite communications (SATCOM)”

    As far as I recall from the 777 communications handbook, this applies only to the pre-2003 AIMS version.

    Btw, I’m still intrigued by the fact that the FI doesn’t mention SITA flight data, although chances are that the alleged disabling of ACARS would have left some traces in the SITA network; or if not, it would be helpful to rule out it did.

    It seems, however, SITA flight data do exist.

    http://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2014/04/06/1857356-boeing-disparu-un-mois-deja-et-toujours-aucune-piste.html

    A rough tranlation is:

    “When I approached SITA, the company confirmed to me that it does have flight data, but declined to say more. Do they have a contractual obligation of discretion in relation to their client Malaysian Airlines …?”

  19. Nederland:

    Factual Information 1.9.4.1 discusses the (SITA) ACARS Traffic Log. Appendix 1.9A has the complete SITA log.

  20. @Crobbie
    You should view this matter of no paint on the fastener within
    the context of the panels it is fastening having experienced an
    extreme impact (crash) event.
    All the other fasteners on that join line either had their heads
    broken off or (more likely) those fasteners’ heads pulled through
    the holes and remained (joined) to the underlaying (panel) piece
    which separated (wrenched) away.
    This particular fastener however, remained joined to this
    (overlaying) recovered panel.
    If it helps, think of the forces acting on the fastener like so;
    Make a fist and hold your forearm vertical (=that’s the fastener).
    Now, the crash occurs – forearm and fist are wrenched violently
    downward. This particular fastener separates (releases) from the
    UNDERLAYING panel piece, so it rebounds violently – so forearm &
    fist now punch violently upward. The overlaying paint on the
    fastener (which may have experienced ‘rivet rash’, as Ken Goodwin
    noted) now experiences a heck of a accelerative ‘whack’ from the
    fastener head, resulting in a disc shaped piece of paint popping
    off the panel (and the fastener head).

    @Phil
    Urgh – not that I think that this matter of the EPESC software
    downgrade is of any relevance (except to the conspiracy adherents),
    but FYI this webpage;
    https://au.linkedin.com/in/mohamed-syafiq-fitri-mohamed-asri-229567a8
    would suggest that ‘TSI = Technical Service Instruction’.
    Also, a german webpage guessed ’77 = type 777′ (i.e. Boering 777).
    Mmmm, and ‘SR = Software Revision’, perhaps.

  21. @Sajid UK
    Thank you for bringing up the elephant in the room. When you look at it in hindsight it’s obvious it took the military to shoot it down and cover it up. All of the nations might have realized this was an accident and no one wanted word to get out. Since most of the passengers were Chinese China had the most to lose if it became known. The Chinese public would be outraged if it found out. It doesn’t really matter to the US, Australia or India. China also has the ability to be completely covert. China certainly has the ability to hack Inmarsat and plant a false trail. Where was the plane shot down? Maybe Malaysia realized the plane had been compromised and when China found out they took action. China would not want it’s citizens to think Uyghurs could hijack a plane. Especially not after the kunming train station attack. Maybe mike McKay was right.

  22. @Gysbreght

    1.9.4.1 confirms it was the pre-2003 AIMS:

    “The ACARS communicates through either SATCOM or VHF. The VHF transceiver can also
    be used for voice transmission when ACARS is switched from the data mode to the voice
    mode.”

    This may also shed light on how to disable it?

    I’m not sure if Appendix 1.9A does include VHF data as the text message by MAS OPS was reportedly retransmitted every 2 minutes for 40 minutes, but there is no indication in that log it was transmitted for longer than 10 minutes or so. The INMARSAT logs, on the other hand, only indicate 2 or 3 retransmissions.

  23. @Owen Wiseman Wrote
    ——————————————————————————————————
    @Ken
    But you say the MH370 fastener is from the same batch as the EL AL 777 , so why does the paint stick to the numbers and letters of this fastener ? it should not by your logic. The paint should have popped off cleanly,not have to be scrapped off surely.
    ——————————————————————————————————
    Never said from same batch or run of fasteners. During this time frame; late 90’s/early 2000’s; Runs or batches of fasteners are made at the fastener vendor. They are shipped to the supplier or Boeing for use. They are installed on a variety of parts for a variety of models. The processing and post production processing changes over time to meet downstream requirements of the fasteners. In this example the adhesion of the paint to the fasteners to reduce or prevent “Rivet rash” caused changes to the fastener processing. We even changed the paint systems used.
    So, “possibly” the fasteners were abraded on the surface prior to installation to improve adhesion and/or the process for cleaning and sealing was changed to improve post application of paint to the fastener.
    Also, consistency of the “Rivet rash” varied from fastener to fastener on the same installation. i.e. variations in the fastener, installation, paint application or operating environment (e.g. higher wind erosion) caused different levels of “Rivet rash”.

    I was there.

  24. Also, to be exact; if you closely examine the picture of the
    recovered part fastener, you can see that ‘some’ paint did
    adhere to the fastener, even despite the crash (and possible
    ‘rivet rash’);
    Tiny pieces of paint adhere in the letter ‘H’, in the centre
    of the numeral ‘0’, in the centre of the (lower part of) the
    numeral ‘6’, possibly in the (upper part) of the letter ‘S’.

  25. @Nederland:

    All this has been discussed here at length. SITA is MAS’ ACARS service provider. It’s logs contain all the traffic. Apperently nothing was sent via VHF. The reason for that was also discussed, as was how to disable ACARS.

    On the ACARS Manager page “VHF only” is selected. That selection brings up the VHF Manager page where the relevant VHF transceiver mode is changed from DATA to VOICE. There was some inconclusive discussion on whether that inhibits incoming as well as outgoing data transmissions.

    The INMARSAT SU log released by Malaysia in March 2014 lists all the retransmissions of the uplink message from MAS OCC.

  26. @Gysbreght

    Yes, I am aware of that as I initiated that discussion at that time.

    The one problem remaining is that the ACARS traffic log expires at 18:25, but according to FI, p. 47, it was retransmitted until 18:43. Obviously there was an SDU reboot in between and it therefore remains somewhat inconclusive whether the message by MAS OPS ever reached the aircraft (as the controller claimed it did). As the Inmarsat logs confirm that there was no ACARS traffic via SATCOM after 17:07 (and contain only the two text transmission attempts of 18:03 and 18:05), this suggests further retransmission attempts occurred via VHF.

    At least it seems to be a contradiction.

  27. @Nederland: This has all been discussed several times before. The log-on status of MH370 in the (SITA) ACARS server timed out from inactivity prior to 18:03. Therefore, no messages were received by MH370 by either SATCOM or VHF.

  28. Nederland:

    The time of 18:43:33 is probably in error. The text refers to figures 1.9J and 1.9K, which show SITA time stamps of 18:03:23 and 18:06:25, respectively. The Inmarsat log shows a second series of retries labelled “automatic ACARS retransmissio after expiry of 90 sec timer. Terminal is not responding.” These end at 18:05:59.905 .

    The last item in the SITA traffic log at 18:15:25 is for Incoming Downlink (failed)

  29. @Owen Wiseman Wrote
    —————————————–
    @Ken
    Re “Rivet Rash ” Have a look at this research and fig 10a . Even with “complete loss of paint adhesion ” you can plainly see paint still in the inscription of the fastener.
    http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.titanium.org/resource/resmgr/2010_2014_papers/MertensTobiasTiUSA2013Disser.pdf

    True. This is a test. Tests show all kinds of results. We found various results in our tests. Adhesion varied from fastener to fastener. These fasteners are rivets, per the caption; the fasteners on the composite part are most likely hi-locks / bolts that do not require riveting or squeeze actions for installation; due to installation in “soft” composite structure. Different processing for rivets versus bolts. Maybe the reason. Don’t know.

  30. @Ken
    Thanks for the replies . Since the two craft were manufactured just weeks between them is it known that the painting procedure was changed or do you think the EL AL 777 has been repainted since first manufacture with a better quality paint material, or was it simply down to luck and positioning on the craft of this particular sample shown ? In hind sight it might have been better to show pictures of the same part on the aircraft for better judgement perhaps. Any way I now see how these differences could occur ,thanks again.

  31. @Ken Goodwin.
    Still the issue on this fastener with paint or not.. Those used are not bolts with a screwed on nut or so. They are pressed nuts on titanium rivets. You cann’t put any kind of screwdriver in its head don’t you? That panel was not meant to be removable.
    I suggest leave this paint-issue aside and concentrate more on how this piece came loose. Look at the broken edges, the front the rear, the forces involved, that kind of things. The piece is confirmed so what the heck about paint sticking or not. Obvious reasons have been clarified (by you f.i.) so move on to more substantional suggestions I suggest.

  32. @VictorI, Gysbreght,

    Thanks for clarification. Yes, it COULD be an error, but doesn’t look much like a typo as other mistakes do in the FI. Perhaps this will be clarified in the final report.

  33. I have a question on the potential satellite communication delays.

    I commented before on the stick versus array antennas. Told no way.

    The question: Does the communication use either of the ARIC 629 or (ARIC 429 – don’t know this bus system)or similar data busses with their communication delays built in due to communication conflict resolution architecture design. (E.g. Each system has a set time allocated to it during the bus request cycle.) That alone delays the signal; if it misses that time due to bus being busy; it waits till the next cycle to request access to the bus and so on. If yes, has that been included in the analysis?

    Managed the group that worked on the, on airplane, flight simulation system for 777.

  34. @Owen Wiseman Wrote
    ——————————————————
    @Ken
    Thanks for the replies . Since the two craft were manufactured just weeks between them is it known that the painting procedure was changed or do you think the EL AL 777 has been repainted since first manufacture with a better quality paint material, or was it simply down to luck and positioning on the craft of this particular sample shown ? In hind sight it might have been better to show pictures of the same part on the aircraft for better judgement perhaps. Any way I now see how these differences could occur ,thanks again.
    Paint system was on airplane for 12 years. So, probably not repainted. Might be. Don’t know. However; we were working on two separate paint systems for the aircraft. Both low VOC paint systems to meet EPA rules. Could have been other paint system. Again, don’t know.
    Different results? Luck, Maybe.
    I did note on the “Rivet Rash” part; there appears to be possible touch up paint around the rivet. You can see a slight step in the paint at the edge of the rivet. E.g. bottom 60 degrees of rivet and between 10 and 11 o’clock This could just be a crack in paint but “might” have been touched up after painting to cover the “Rivet Rash”. With the paint subsequently falling off anyway. Again don’t know.

  35. @Sajid UK
    Governments have been known to engage in cover-ups. Whose interests are being protected here? Knowing that may lead us somewhere.

    http://nypost.com/2016/04/17/how-us-covered-up-saudi-role-in-911/

    “In its report on the still-censored “28 pages” implicating the Saudi government in 9/11, “60 Minutes” last weekend said the Saudi role in the attacks has been “soft-pedaled” to protect America’s delicate alliance with the oil-rich kingdom.”

    “That’s quite an understatement.”

    “Actually, the kingdom’s involvement was deliberately covered up at the highest levels of our government. And the coverup goes beyond locking up 28 pages of the Saudi report in a vault in the US Capitol basement. Investigations were throttled. Co-conspirators were let off the hook.”

  36. @buyerninety

    Thanks,
    TSI = Technical Service Instruction
    SR = Software Revision (sounds reasonable)

    As far as “Urgh – not that I think that this matter of the EPESC software
    downgrade is of any relevance (except to the conspiracy adherents)…”

    I would point out that the proprietor of this blog has hypothesized a spoof scenario, so anything potentially related to that would be of particular relevance here. Furthermore, examining all aspects of a problem does not make one a “conspiracy adherent”. (In this case, a conspiracy adherent might conflate your use of “Urgh” with “Uighur”, however).

  37. @Ge Rijn Wrote
    @Ken Goodwin.
    Still the issue on this fastener with paint or not.. Those used are not bolts with a screwed on nut or so. They are pressed nuts on titanium rivets. You cann’t put any kind of screwdriver in its head don’t you? That panel was not meant to be removable.
    I suggest leave this paint-issue aside and concentrate more on how this piece came loose. Look at the broken edges, the front the rear, the forces involved, that kind of things. The piece is confirmed so what the heck about paint sticking or not. Obvious reasons have been clarified (by you f.i.) so move on to more substantional suggestions I suggest.

    You are referring to Lock bolts. The nuts are squeezed onto the Ti pins using a hydraulic tool. The nuts don’t have threads but grooves to hold the pin in place after pulling and squeezing. The squeezing/pulling is relatively low force on part compared to rivet installation force. Thus used on composite panels. Other fastener systems use tear off nuts like Hi Locks. True; They like rivets and Hi-locks are not meant to be removed. Only fasteners with nut systems like nuts plates, etc are to be removed for maintenance. Note: We developed fastener removal systems for all fasteners used. Required for rework.

    With regard to the forces that caused these parts to come loose from the airplane. Anything from a controlled landing on the water, e.g. 767 off Africa (which lots parts too), to a complete breakup at altitude could in MHO caused these parts to come loose.

    My best guess is that MH370 flew on in relatively level flight, they do fly quite stable without pilot input, wandering around the Indian Ocean without complete auto pilot control, ran out of fuel, timing seems about right from the satellite pings, and glided to impact the Indian ocean, well above landing speed (maybe 250 knots), wheels up, impacted the water, one engine cowl or the other hitting first (lowest part of the airplane with wheels up), cart wheeling like the controlled crash of the 767 off the coast of Africa, the cart wheel would accelerate one side of the airplane, increasing the impact forces on one wing and breaking up enough of the fuselage to dislodge a piece of the interior along with segments of the wings secondary structure.

    Interesting to know if the wing parts are mostly from one side of the airplane.

  38. @Ken Goodwin: The navigation data is supplied to the SDU over an ARINC 429 bus. Unlike 629, 429 defines a single transmitter and multiple receivers. As such, there are no bus conflicts.

    Per specification, the timing of the output of the SATCOM is tightly synced to the P-channel from the GES, and likely is controlled by a low level device such as an FPGA. Experts agree that is highly unlikely that a system upset could cause this timing to degrade.

  39. AM2/Sajid – shoot down/electronic deterrence – everything about this flight(data) begins to make sense if this plane was on it’s way to attack a site in Australia, NW Cape being an obvious one. Dennis has been pointing to lack of motive but you would suddenly have one? It would the explain the politics we have observed since as well.

    RE Pakistani nukes – it’s close to a failed state so assurances from some General about their security falls flat. This is the crowd that hid Bin Laden for a decade. A few years back renegade elements of their Navy tried to commandeer a ship to attack a US carrier and both govts happy to play it down. MH370 could be in the same category.

  40. A terrorist attack by one of the USUAL suspects doesn’t make sense to me, because even failed attempts are usually proudly advertised – it still caused pain and suffering, which is usually the point.

    Yes, it is possible to explain the lack of credit taken by assuming all perps went down with the ship. But then we are left with a theory requiring rogue perps smart enough to defeat all security, yet not smart enough to get a political message out into cyberspace at any time before, during, or after the fact. Hinky.

    The only cover-up scenarios that still make any sense to me are:

    1) INADVERTENT shoot-down – either entirely by accident, or misinterpreting mechanical trouble as a terrorist act – does explain both the need for a cover-up and the lack of anyone taking credit.

    2) Geopolitical knee-capping: some entity wants some other entity to know what they can now do to planes up in the sky. Secrecy seen as beneficial to BOTH sides: buys authorities time to rectify, perp leverage to negotiate. @Matty, @Jeff: you have each presented plausible potential perps. I will add NK to the pile.

    3) Spy games: something on board was worth enough to sacrifice PAX and crew in its pursuit. (It can’t possible have been, but corrupt systems cause good people to think bad thoughts.)

    Still waiting for someone brave enough to do the right thing, and leak the truth.

  41. Brock – maybe a butchered attempt at terrorism. He(Hamid) had to get there in daylight which meant he had to burn off time and miscalculated the fuel burn/alt/speed badly? Means he glided in as you would in that situation. I wouldn’t be in a rush to claim that one? But it would have been very symbolic to hit a place like NW Cape.

  42. Following up on @MuOne’s posted image of a B737 showing the faintest hint of red writing on the underside of extended flaps: here is a link to a slightly closer-up image of red writing on the underside of a B747 flap:

    https://woodyh.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/flaps2.jpg

    Unfortunately, the image is still too fuzzy for me to read the message (warning?) – does anyone know from experience what this says?

    I echo MuOne’s call for better imagery. Red writing on any exterior/near-exterior layer of B777-200ER control surfaces would be of particular value.

    Anyone willing to consider a cover-up – yet NOT willing to consider the aerodynamically shaped piece discovered last May in Vabbinfaru, Maldives – is, in my opinion, attempting to walk a very fine line.

  43. @Matty, @Brock. So, in a NW Cape scenario we would certainly have expected debris on the NW WA coast early on (unless all has been salvaged) and the latest debris finds are looking most likely to be planted?
    Brock, yes I think your 2) above is distinctly possible.

  44. AM2 – Debris – my understanding is that debris from an impact near the arc adjacent to NW Cape would end up in Africa. It’s never been well explained how the search ended up there in the first place, unless I missed it. I suspect the US is not worried about the plane. I think they know what happened and finding it is not that important to them.

    It would mean it was planned to a degree but only activated when opportunity arose and involved an element of impulse. Flying lower and fast he used too much fuel and the reboot was accidental/incidental? Some rookie errors and the overall need for very careful planning just wasn’t met. Plenty of plots fall apart.

  45. Trond,

    About 2 pages ago you asked how was it resolved after it was thought they were in Cambodian airspace.

    As far as I can figure, MAS realized they were looking at a flight projection “not suitable for tracking” according to the Preliminary Report. After that I am assuming continual bumbling between MAS and ATC in the early hour or hours.

    Oleksandr/Rob/Phil/Oz,

    Catching up a couple days here on the IFE discussions. Do I have this understood correctly:

    1. IFE responds on time 90 seconds after the first logon at 18:25 as set up to do (has separate wiring)

    2. However in that response fails to include the ID identifier number

    3. IFE fails to respond at all in second logon at end of flight assuming switched off by cockpit PIC?

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