How Did MH370’s Flaperon Come Off?

In my last post, I reviewed Malaysia’s analysis of the MH370 debris its investigators have gathered. Not included in that study was the flaperon found on Réunion, as it is being held by the French. So today I’d like to look at what the damage patterns seen on the flaperon suggest about the crash, based on the work done by IG member Tom Kenyon and by a reader of this blog, @HB.

On February 3 of this year, Kenyon released an updated version of his report “MH370 Flaperon Failure Analysis” in which he gives an overview of the flaperon’s structure and how it was damaged. He notes that of the six main structural attachment points of the aircraft, the two biggest and most significant are the flaperon hinges (pictured above). They snapped in the middle:

The lesser attachment points failed in a similar way. That is to say, they did not rip away the flaperon structure to which they were attached.

Kenyon observes:

The location of the failure points of Flaperon hinges is consistent with a large singular lateral force or repetitive lateral (or torsional) movement of the hinges in the inboard/outboard direction. If Flaperon was separated from the Flaperon hinge with forces in forward/aft direction or by applying forces to the Flaperon in the extreme rotated up/down direction (beyond structural stops) then deformation of the Flaperon structure due to such forces would be evident. Significant and permanent deformation of the Flaperon structure does not appear to be present in photographs of the Flaperon.

Recall that two scenarios have been proposed for the flaperon coming off 9M-MRO: either the plane hit the water, or it came off as the result of flutter in a high-speed dive. Neither event could reasonably be expect to produce a primarily lateral (that is side-to-side) force on the flaperon of the kind Kenyon describes.

To raise the level of perplexity, Kenyon points out in other crashes involving 777s, failures didn’t occur at the hinges; rather, the hinges remained intact and the material to which they were attached broke. That is to say, hinges are stronger than the flaperon proper. Here’s an example from MH17:

Kenyon concludes that:

No significant evidence of secondary structural damage excludes a massive trailing edge strike and leads the author to conclude that the Flaperon separated from MH370 while in the air and did not separate from the wing due to striking water or land.

In other words, since the damage isn’t consistent with a crash into the sea, we can deduce that flaperon must have come off in the air. The only conceivable cause would be high-speed flutter. However, on closer inspection the evidence seems to rule out flutter, as well.

The reader who goes by the handle @HB is an expert in quantitative risk assessment in the transportation industry and has extensive experience with composite materials. In a comment to the last post, he observed:

For the flaperon… the lift/drag load is normally passed on the honeycomb panel over the exposed surface area then the primary stucture of the component (the aluminum frame of the flaperon) then the hinges then the primary aluminum stucture of the wing.

In a nut shell, those panels are not designed to sustain any in-plane loads either compressive or tensile. They are just designed to resist bending due to uniform lift load on the surface (top FRP layer in tension and bottom FRP layer in compression, the honeycomb is basically maintaining the distance between the layers without much strength).Those panels can arguably take a little bit of shear load due to drag forces on the top skin (top and bottom forces in opposite direction) but not much due to limits in the honeycomb strength.

The second thing to consider are the GRP properties. The GRP is very tough in tensile mode, much stronger than Steel. In compression mode, it buckles easily and only the honeycomb is preventing this. This is by far the weakest failure mode. If it fails, you will see fibres pulled out link strings on a rope failing under tension. For the skin under compression, you will see sign of compression on the honeycomb but the fibres will have to be pulled out as well. Also, a perfect manufacturing does not exist, there are always delamination (small bonding defects) between the honeycomb and the GRP skin to weaken further the compressive strength.

The hinges are usually much stronger as all the load is passing through them (analogy door hinges).

So you could imagine, if there is a large impact the hinges are expected to fail last. The part of the skin that will buckle is expected to fail first.

@HB here is agreeing with Kenyon: it is baffling that the flaperon came off the plane due to failure within the hinges. But @HB goes further, arguing that this type of damage is inconsistent with flutter:

I would tend to agree that the hinges have been subject to cyclic fatigue… the hinges appear to have been subject to cyclic lateral forces which are not expected in any accidental circumstances (take door hinges, for instance, and imagine the hinge fail after 50 times someone is trying to burst through – you can try at home but it is very unlikely to happen). This of course requires a closer look by experts to double confirm. I cannot think myself of any possible lateral force on this part in the first place but a lateral force that will fail the hinges and not the skin which is weaker is very hard to explain. Try with a wooden door and tell me if you manage.

In a followup comment, @HB observes that even under very strong oscillation the flaperon should not be expected to disintegrate. “If hydraulic power is on, fluttering is unlikely to cause any disintegration. If off, fluttering forces are up and down and the hinges are free to move. Lateral forces, I think, would be small in comparison with the vertical forces and not be strong enough to cause fatigue on the hinges.”

Kenyon concludes his report with a list of six questions and issues generated from his analysis. While all are worthwhile, one stands out to me as particularly urgent:

• Why are the official investigators silent on releasing preliminary reports on their Flaperon analysis? Why would France’s Direction générale de l’armement / Techniques aéronautiques (DGA) release photographic data to ATSB and yet chose not to make Flaperon Analysis findings public after such a long period of elapsed time?

To sum up, a close examination of the flaperon’s breakage points does not yield any comprehensible explanation for how it came off the plane, commensurate with a terminal plunge into the southern Indian Ocean.

This is baffling but unsurprising. Every time we look at the debris data carefully, we find that it contradicts expectations. The barnacle distribution doesn’t match the flotation tests. The barnacle paleothermetry doesn’t match the drift modelling. The failure analysis doesn’t match the BFO data. And on and on.

Something is seriously amiss.

296 thoughts on “How Did MH370’s Flaperon Come Off?”

  1. Recently Victor Iannello published a file containing the ‘Unredacted’ INMARSAT Data Logs for the MH370 accident flight and the preceding flight MH371 from Beijing to Kuala Lumpur. The preceding flight is actually the most interesting part, in particular the fuel consumption data provided in Position Reports and Engine Health Monitoring (EHM) Reports that were sent via ACARS.

    I was interested in the EHM reports, in particular in a difference in fuel flow between the left and the right engine during cruise. That proved to be more difficult than I first thought, partly because some of the EnRoute (ER) reports seem to be incomplete or corrupted, but mainly because the format of the ER reports is different from the IC and CL reports provided in Malaysia’s “Factual Information” report. Without a suitable ‘template’ one has a bunch of data and has to guess what they mean. In the strings of numbers separated by CR/LF (Carriage Return/Line Feed) sequences I identified two values that could be the fuel flows of the Left and right engine. It would seem that in cruise at FL400 M.833 the left and right engine indicated fuel flows are 6607 and 6839 lb/hr, respectively.

    The difference of about 3.5% could be due either to a calibration shift of one of the fuel flow transmitters, a problem with the EPR measurements of both engines, or an actual difference in engine fuel efficiency. It seems to be roughly in agreement with the ATSB’s December 2015 statement that “the left engine could have continued to run for up to 15 minutes after the right engine flamed-out”.

    Just wondering if someone else was interested in those data and maybe reached a different conclusion.

    https://www.dropbox.com/s/elf87ze0zdjad1e/MH371_EHM_Export.xls?dl=0

    Credits:
    “Richard” decoded the INMARSAT Signalling Units from Hex to Ascii.

    “sk999” provided a comprehensive listing of the Position Reports.

  2. P.S.
    The FCOM Long Range Cruise Control table indicates the nominal fuel flow per engine at FL400/ISA 200t M.84 as 3091 kg/h (6814 lb/hr).

  3. @Gysbreght

    Yes, I for one was very interested to learn about the MH371 fuel flow data, I’m sure others are too but like me, lack the wherewithal to extract anything meaningful from this data. It would be a nice to get a more definitive MRC endurance/range figure. Possibly a task for DrB?

  4. Gysbreght:

    Re: “It would seem that in cruise at FL400 M.833 the left and right engine indicated fuel flows are 6607 and 6839 lb/hr, respectively.” (delta = 3.5%)”

    If those are the fuel flows at 40,000 feet, the ratio does not seem to be consistent with ratios observed for MH370 and MH371 at takeoff and climb. For the MH371 flight (lbs/hr)

    Left Eng Right Eng R/L ratio
    Takeoff 21,091 21,540 1.021 (2.1% delta)
    Climb (20,468 ft) 16,388 16,542 1.012 (1.2% delta)

    These values are very close to those observed in MH370 FI. At cruise altitude, I would expect the ratio to be less than 1%, not 3.5%.

    Please connect the dots. Which records do you think contain this data?

  5. ALSM:

    I’ve explained to you earlier that your way of extrapolating the TO and CLB delta’s makes no sense in terms of turbine engine performance characteristics. You need to correct fuel flows for differences in ambient temperature and pressure.

  7. ALSM:

    Besides, the difference could well be due to a faulty fuel flow transmitter, since the left engine is indicating less fuel flow than nominal. We need to have access to the the fuel quantities in the tanks before and after flight to check the accuracy of the fuel flow transmitters.

  8. ALSM:

    If your question is “Which records do you think contain this data?” you’ll find the answer in the spreadsheet.

  9. ALSM: See spreadsheet:

    WF-Left engine: Cells K47&L47&M47&F48$G48 = 6607
    WF-Right engine: Cells I52&J52&K52&L52&M52 = 6814

  10. Gysbreght:

    Or maybe you are looking at PKFR (Pack Mass Flow Rate) 66.07 and 68.39, which were 69.70 and 66.80 on Take Off for MH370.

  13. Gysbreght:

    Don and I have been looking at the other DFB ERs. There is a pattern that suggests you may have correctly guessed the Left and Right fuel flows. The 40,000 ft R/L ratios are very surprising, but the larger pattern is undeniable, and the sum of the R+L agree with known totals. Analysis is here:
    https://goo.gl/fx4xdh

  14. @David, you said “So if the flutter boundary is based on no hydraulics, having one flaperon actuator active would extend its flutter boundary even beyond certification limits, the APU further yet again.”

    Sorry for late response, yes this is an interesting question as the stiffness introduced by the hydraulic has some influence on the natural frequency.
    Here is my qualitative analysis for this scenario focusing on the trailing edge damage.
    (1) Case of hydaulic pressure on: we have a plate cantilever type problem. All expected to be within design limit at transonic speed as mentioned above. The natural frequency given the stiffness will be for sure higher than 50-100 Hz and Broadbent Number higher than 1.5. The terminal velocity is generally expected to be within M=1.04 limit if no power is on. If engine power in on, it is another story.
    (2) Case of no hydraulic power: i will still presume those hydraulic actuators to be provided with localised accumulators ie as such, if not used, the pressure is sufficient for one or two actuation without the need for RAT power of hydraulic pump power as typical hydraulic systems (need to be verified). In any case, assuming worst case of no hydraulic pressure and hinges free to rotate (make analogie to a flag), the natural frequency of the system will be relatively low and the flutter frequency to high speed will largely overcome that. In that case the load would be on the hinges (not torsional). When in comes to flutter of the component itself say the top FRP layer, it will be extremely high as the free hinge movement will dampen any frequency on the surface of the component itself (here it is a rigid flag). None of the cases would meet the Broadbent Criteria.
    In my opinion, unless the plane descent was supersonic or, another possibility, total desintegration before hand such as Lockerbie case, Flutter induced damage could be ruled out.
    I will try to make some calculations to further illustrate. A detailed analysis of delaminations defects should also be able to confirm.

  15. @CliffG, Thank you! I had a very lengthy discussion with a lawyer on the subject of legal claims around MH17 and MH370, and it’s clearly going to be tough in either case, but much harder with regard to MH370; when it comes to MH17, evidence has carefully been assembled to show a clear picture of what happened, but some important piece are still missing. With MH370 we have only an accumulation of circumstantial evidence. I think that as time goes by the weight of evidence will continue to accumulate, but whether it will ever reach the level where a legal case could be won, I don’t know. Also bear in mind that Russia has withdrawn from international treaties that would allow it to be sued for such crimes.

  16. @David

    You are right about the aileron damage but it did not seperate on ChinaAir 006.
    The only wing-related parts that seperated where 2 main gear landing doors and other landing gear doors got damaged after the landing gear was deployed.
    This is a single similarity with MH370 for we have also a piece of nose gear door from MH370.

    And the NTSB report states Vmo was exceeded more than once. At 24.500ft Mach 0.92 is mentioned and 394 KIAS.

    https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR8603.pdf

    The aerodynamic overloads and 5.1G happened during the pull-out. No report off any flutter damage.

    Maybe MH370 exceeded this overloads, speed and G’s. I don’t think so but cann’t rule it out either ofcourse.

  17. ALSM: “There is a pattern that suggests you may have correctly guessed the Left and Right fuel flows.”

    Thanks for responding with your analysis of the EHM ER reports. Can you provide a little background to explain what you are showing on the first page? I’m puzzled by the two fuel flow values appearing close together, with nothing between.

    My spreadsheet copied sequences H16 – H19 from Richard’s file. The fuel flow values are in H17, starting at row 3711 in Richard’s file, Msg initiated at 07:22:13.239, sequence no’s 10 and 15, four rows of data between the two fuel flow values. The Data Sample Time in H16 is 05:06:41, same as in your “Msg initiated at 07:19:31.406”, but Richard’s file has no Msg initiated at that time.

  19. ALSM: It appears there are two ER reports, both sampled at 05:06:41 but not showing the same fuel flows.

    Also the data structure is quite different. In your report the left and right fuel flows follow each other, and engine serial numbers appear much later on the SU’s time-stamped 07:19:55.221 and 07:19:55.400, also one immediately after the other.

    In my file I first located the ESN’s and found the respective fuel flows on the same line as the ESN’s.

    Strange.

  20. @Ge Rijn
    “The aerodynamic overloads and 5.1G happened during the pull-out.”

    The Z simulator data has some higher G forces which I have attempted to say may indicate some maneuver of a dive and pull-out, perhaps going to FL400 first, which I presume could be analogous to what happened at IGARI in the real flight. Anyways I stand alone on this inference…not getting much traction on it.

  22. Gysbreght:

    The two messages which show data recorded at 05:06:41 are not the same type of message. See the msg identifier field for each. One is DFB and the other is DFB. Only the DFB type messages are relevant here. Also, ESNs only appear in DFB messages.

    2.9M-MROH17D40AMH0371#DFBMROS371ER 317070314050641ZBAAWMKK434000

    2.9M-MROH16D43AMH0371#DFBCSMROS371ER 317070314050641ZBAAWMKK434000

  23. Hmmm…looks like the text I wrote did not post correctly. Everything between gets deleted. Should read:

    The two messages which show data recorded at 05:06:41 are not the same type of message. See the msg identifier field for each. One is DFB 01 and the other is DFB 19. Only the DFB 01 type messages are relevant here. Also, ESNs only appear in DFB 47 messages.

    With replaced with [ and ]:

    [soh]2.9M-MRO[nak]H17[stx]D40AMH0371#DFB[01]MROS371ER 317070314050641ZBAAWMKK434000

    [soh]2.9M-MRO[nak]H16[stx]D43AMH0371#DFB[19]CSMROS371ER 317070314050641ZBAAWMKK434000

  24. ALSM: I struggled quite a bit in trying to make sense of these data and must confess complete ignorance of the things you are trying to tell me. Please try to help me a little.

    “The two messages which show data recorded at 05:06:41 are not the same type of message. See the msg identifier field for each.”
    Well, I noted already that the two messages are not the same type. Why are two messages of different type created for the same event? What is the “msg identifier field”?

    “One is DFB 01 and the other is DFB 19. Only the DFB 01 type messages are relevant here.”
    What is the meaning of DFB? What is the difference between DFB 01 and DFB 19? Why are only DFB 01 type messages relevant here?

    “Also, ESNs only appear in DFB 47 messages.”
    The reports are sent in several batches, apparently limited to 31 SU’s per batch. The ESN’s appear in both reports, only the location in the reports is different.
    The MH370 IC report is sent in batches H13+H14+H15. H13 is #DFB[03] and contains the ESN’s.

    The MH370 CL report is sent in batches H16+H17+H18+H19. H16 is DFB[45] and contains the ESN’s.

  25. @ALSM

    I think this information from your link is not correct.

    The lat/long cördinates mentioned; 5.40/100.29 are in the city of Sungai Petani well north/east of Penang on the mainland.

    And according the RMP-report; ‘the detection was made by sector 2 of BBFARLIM2 base station which is located in Bandar Baru Air Itam’:

    http://jeffwise.net/2016/11/11/long-rumored-police-report-of-cell-tower-connection-leaks-at-last/comment-page-3/

    This part of the suburb is located south west of the hill range that encloses it to the east, south and west; lat/long 5.23’11/100.16’55

  26. @ALSM

    When this information is correct I don’t think there could be a line of sight and detection past the hills if MH370 flew that route around the south of Penang.

    And I think in way this was confirmed by the test flights afterwards following that route.
    Several cell tower detections/connections were made but only in the south.
    BBFARLIM2 detected/connected not one cellphone in those tests.

  27. @ALSM

    And to add something else.
    If the photo in the link is indeed the actual Base Station cell site which it states, you can also see the hills in the background behind it quite near.

    The location pin-pointed in the GoogleEarth picture in the link shows there are no hills there near that location.

  29. Ge Rijn:

    You must be having trouble plotting positions in GE. 5.4052469, 100.2981119 is the correct location of the cell base station. It is in Air Itam as the photos show. The elevation angle was high enough to make the path line of sight.

    If there is any error, it was in the antenna gain pattern. I used an example antenna from the internet, but the actual antenna pattern may be different.

  30. @ALSM @others

    I guess my GoogleEarth works the same as yours or anyone else?
    Did you double check? I did several times.
    5.40/100.29 points in my GE to a location in the city of Sungai Petani on the mainland.
    Can others please double check too?

    And Bandar Baru Air Itam is not the same as Air Itam. It is specifically named in the RMP report.
    In GE you can see this suburb is to the south just west of the hill-range to the east.

  33. Ge Rijn:

    5.40/100.29 is not a valid lat/lon location format. Use the location I specified in the format I provided ( 5.4052469, 100.2981119) and you see the cell site antennas in street view. It is 2km from the center of Farlim (copied from your link: Bandar Baru Ayer Itam (GPS: 5.39238, 100.28537), better known as Farlim, is a major township in Air Itam).

  34. Ge Rijn: Actually, 5.40/100.29 does work in GE. Your rounded rounded location is 1.0 km from the cell site I specified to greater accuracy. (5.4052469, 100.2981119). Try putting in all digits.

  36. @Ge Rijn. “And the NTSB report states Vmo was exceeded more than once. At 24.500ft Mach 0.92 is mentioned and 394 KIAS.”
    The figures here are the Vmo limits. The captain said Vmo was exceeded but at p25 para 5 you will find, “Although the captain said that the airplane exceeded Vmo twice and… all three crew members said that they did not hear the overspeed warning…. Examination of the reliable recorded airspeed data points showed that the Vmo limitation was not exceeded during the descent.”

    As you say there is no evidence MH370 did or did not exceed its flight envelope though in some simulations it did. The impression I have is that their character is consistent with the final BFOs.

    @HB. Thanks. Your calculation supposing there was no hydraulic pressure applies to the port flaperon and hence the flutter limit, whether the RAT was operative or not, since the RAT does not hydraulically power its actuators.

    Yes engines under power would of course affect terminal velocity though that might assume an active pilot. Without one it may be the aircraft will pitch up at high Mach, engines or not.

    I will be interested in your further calcs. Some points of interest:
    • The hinges of the flaperon are well beneath it and that might make a difference, hydraulic power off, compared with being at the leading edge.
    • In take off the flaperons can ‘flutter’ (Boeing description) in take-off, not being hydraulically powered initially, their weight being lifted as the aircraft accelerates; and also in ground runs: though ‘shake’ might be a better descriptor.
    • Flutter is not restricted to control surfaces: it could be the wing too. Again that would not be within the flutter boundary unless there were damage which alters frequency, ie affecting aerodynamics, or structure, including mass distribution. Loss of lifting of control devices like (but not restricted to) the flaperons could do that.

  38. @ALSM

    I zoom in on Penang and then go with my cursor to the lat/long of choice which shows in the lat/long numbers right under in the GE screen.
    Is this a different notation than you use?

    The GE-pictures in your link show also the location is around 5.24/100.17 for the lat/longs are pictured there.

  39. @David, the FSX manual clearly mentions that the drag coefficient is underpredicted regarding the Victor’s simulation. This means that M=1.1 is widely overpredicted. Given the high operating speed of the B777 i would not be surprised that the Design Dive Speed be higher than that. Any Malaysia and ATSB only need to ask Boeing and so far this is not reported anywhere.

    Still working on the calculations. (What annoys me is that these can be easily done by the ATSB as it isvtheir job and i am spending a lot of time for that lack of detailed analysis. They also have accessbto Boeing data)

    Note the hydraulics only influences the natural frequency of the component but it depends what you are looking at. If you look at oscilations on the top FRP layer, it won’t as the layer will still be solidly attached to the rest of the component. No hydraulic will further dampen these.

    You are right wing can flutter too. For wing the Broadbent criteria is only 1. If you look at the overal component, the stiffer and shorter the component is the higher the natural frequency and the lower propensity to flutter.
    The takeoff scenario is more like flapping. But this mode could obviously damage the hinges but not the trailing edge. And flapping like you said is more an issue at low speed. It seems incredible at high speed as you need to reach the low frequency of the free moving assembly.

  41. Hi Jeff,
    Thank you for this article, and the many articles and countless hours you have spent on this matter. (It must surely be in the thousands now). I have kept up to date by reading your articles, but not mostly, the comments. So what I’m about to say may miss some contributions or nuance that is present in the comments, but not in the main articles.

    My first question will be pretty blunt – 1) in your opinion, is the damage to the pieces that you have been able to examine consistent with deliberate, not-in-flight, destruction of a plane or plane components by someone?

    2) (this might be hard to answer – but I bet some contributor to this site will know) – how closely tracked are parts for Boeing 777 aircraft? Are they made only by Boeing? Do they have unique part identifiers? Have any part identifiers been found on any of the debris that purportedly comes from MH370?

    3) If not, is it feasible to speculate about where one might, if one were so inclined, find parts that one could mutilate in an attempt to create a ‘cover story’ for actions that might have been taken?

    Thanks again for your efforts over the years (!) and the continuing excellent writing and cogent analysis on this blog.

  42. @Ge Rijn
    Note the Design Dive Speed is much higher thqn that to ensure the plane can survive a dive.

  43. @HB

    Yes, I see Vc (cruise speed) is 0.80 of Vd (design dive speed).
    Then there is also Ma.c (Mach cruise speed), Ma.mo (Mach max operating speed) and Ma.d (Mach design dive speed) all with margins also depending on altitude.
    Rather complicated..

    It’s all mentioned here:

    https://books.google.nl/books?id=9T5kd-ewRE8C&pg=PA1140&lpg=PA1140&dq=dive+design+speed&source=bl&ots=5gU2tAtnKC&sig=4xz4asJa37itqGcXumPz5rL6VIE&hl=nl&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzo8bT-dbUAhXHfFAKHa1jAOUQ6AEIZTAG#v=onepage&q=dive%20design%20speed&f=false

  44. @Eoghanf, I really appreciate your kind words. To answer your questions:
    1) I think that they are more consistent with that kind of destruction than any in-flight or upon-impact breakup. Not a smoking gun, though.
    2) Parts do have unique identifiers, but fragments won’t necessarily. Most of those found do not have parts numbers that irrefutably link them to 9M-MRO. However, the flaperon had internal numbers that mean it could only have come from that plane. Bear in mind that if someone took the plane, they would have a ready source of parts to salt around the Indian Ocean, so the authenticity of the parts doesn’t necessarily mean that skullduggery didn’t take place.

  45. @ALSM,

    Just to be sure, please confirm that the antenna for the mobile base station that you are talking about is on the
    Saint John Ambulace Malaysia Building, Negeri Pula Pnang,
    Address: 24, Jalan Grove, 11400 George Town, Pulau Pinang, Malaysia.
    Phone: +60 4-828 5972 as per here: ?
    https://www.google.com.au/search?q=Saint+John+Ambulace+Malaysia+Building%2C+Negeri+Pula+Pnang&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&client=firefox-b-ab&gfe_rd=cr&ei=XRBPWcWIJ4Tp8weLooLgBw#q=Saint+John+Ambulance+Malaysia+Building,+Negeri+Pulau+Pinang&rflfq=1&rlha=0&rllag=5406942,100354058,6198&tbm=lcl&rldimm=3631369088060345389&tbs=lrf:!2m1!1e2!3sEAE,lf:1,lf_ui:2&gfe_rd=cr

    .

  46. @ventus45

    If you zoom-in on the map in your link (click the ambulance photo away..), you can see that St.Johns Ambulance Building is far from the township Bandar Baru Air Itam (cq. Farlim) which is more to the south, west of the hill range and mentioned in the RMP-report as the location where base station BBFARLIM2 is located (and Farlim/Bandar Baru Air Itam) is also in the name of this station..).
    St. Johs Ambulance Building is not even in Air Itam which the adres also tells for it says George Town. Air Itam starts more to the west.

    The building is also different then the one shown in the link @ALSM provided.
    And the building location lat/longs mentioned there (5’40/100’29) are also far off according the GoogleEarth notation for a Bandar Baru Air Itam/Georgetown location.

    This is still not explained properly IMO.

  47. to add; I suppose BBFARLIM represents ‘Bandar- Baru-FARLIM’ which points to the specific part of Farlim named Bandar Baru Ait Itam which is shown as a slightly darker colored township in the map of your link.

  49. @ventus45

    Thanks a lot for those detailed pictures.
    They indeed show the building which is also in the link @ALSM provided earlier which is the low building next to the St Johns Ambulance Building.
    And they show the exact spot-location which is not in Bandar Baru Air Itam and even not in Air Itam.

    I question your 75 degree boresight though. In my understanding those antennas consist of three seperate antenna sectors each covering 90 degrees of a circle.
    Sector 2 of BBFARLIM2 would be one of those sectors.
    The sector you use and shows in your building-pictures faces towards the north east covering 90 degrees in that direction.
    But I don’t know if this is sector two of the antenna. Do you, or someone else?

    The other sectorss face to the south and the north west.
    As stated before the location cannot be right according the RMP-report for this building is not in Bandar Baru Air Itam.
    And from that area a lign of side to the south, due east and west is not possible for it’s blocked by the ~200m hills that surround that area.
    The only lign of sight possible from Bandar Baru Air Itam is a restricted view to the north east.

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